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Abstract
There is a growing body of literature about the drivers, size, and trends of 
the shadow economy. This paper quantifies the size and assesses the trends 
of the shadow economy in Eswatini over a period of 16 years. Using gross 
domestic product as a development indicator and other macroeconomic 
variables from government and international institutions the paper employs a 
structural equation model in the form of the Multiple Indicator Multiple Cause 
approach to determine the drivers of the shadow economy in Eswatini as well 
as to quantify its size. The results show that taxation (direct and indirect), self-
employment, agricultural value added, and regulations were the causes for the 
development of the shadow economy in Eswatini. The results also indicate that 
the shadow economy in Eswatini was at 37.4 percent of the formal economy 
or gross domestic product in 2016. This means that the current gross domestic 
product of the country has been underestimated by E20.5 billion due to the 
exclusion of economic activities taking place outside of the formal economy 
when computing gross domestic product. 
Keywords: Shadow economy; Multiple Indicator; Multiple Cause; Eswatini.
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1. Introduction
Interest in understanding the shadow economy emanates mainly from the policy 
implications for government revenue. The shadow economy is widely referred 
to as the informal sector or parallel economy. For the purposes of this study, the 
term shadow economy is adopted. Generally shadow economic activities are a 
result of government’s inability to monitor all economic activities which can be 
attributed to time and resource constraints (Hassan & Schneider, 2015).
Researchers attempting to quantify the shadow economy are often faced with 
an intricate task in determining which activities constitute the shadow economy. 
Shadow economic activities can be in the form of unregistered business 
operation or subsistence income generating projects. Schneider (1994a, 2003, 
2005, and 2011) provides a definition of the shadow economy, which is a useful 
starting point in the theoretical discussions of the shadow economy. The shadow 
economy can be broadly defined as an amalgam of all unregistered economic 
activities that would contribute to the overall national income (gross domestic 
product) if monitored (Schneider 2003).
Some definitions exclude constitutionally unlawful activities while others 
incorporate them. What is common in all definitions is the neglect of household 
income generating informal economic activity for sustenance purposes. While 
the definition applied in the estimation determines the size shadow economy, 
there is general consensus that the shadow economy accounts for a sizable 
portion of the economy especially in developing countries. If all these economic 
activities are officially registered they would be liable to taxation and government 
regulation (Hassan & Schneider, 2015).
For the purposes of this study, the shadow economy encompasses all legal 
but unregistered economic activities that would, if monitored, contribute to the 
overall gross domestic product.
There has been increasing evidence that suggests that shadow economic 
activities have reached remarkable proportions globally (Schneider et al., 2010). 
Worldwide, the shadow economy accounts for approximately 13.7 percent of 
the world’s gross domestic product (GDP).1 Additionally, the Organizations 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2009) established that 
1 Calculated from 10 trillion U.S dollars’ contribution of the global shadow economy (Neuwirth 2011) di-
vided by 72.924 trillion U.S dollar’s value of the global gross domestic product (World Bank 2011) which 
is yields 13.7 percent. 
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almost 1.8 billion of the global population is, in one way or another, employed 
in the shadow economy.   
Generally, developed countries regulate, through policy, shadow economic 
activities such that they remain below 10 percent. However, the literature does 
not provide a similar benchmark for developing countries. By identifying the 
driver of the shadow economy, this paper will assist policy makers by providing 
information on which factors need to be altered in order to influence the size of 
the shadow economy in the country.
The subsequent sections of this paper are organised as follows. Section two 
discusses the relationship between the shadow economy and the mainstream 
economy. In section three the paper presents the theoretical framework 
of the shadow economy. In section four, the paper presents the data and 
methodology utilised in quantifying the size of the shadow economy. Section 
five presents a summary of the results and discussions. Section six  presents the 
conclusions of this paper and section seven provides the policy implications 
and recommendations.
2. Literature
2.1. The relationship between the shadow economy and the formal economy
The shadow economy is a multi-dimensional, multi-faceted phenomenon, which 
inevitably accompanies the formal economy throughout the world (Krstic & 
Schneider, 2015). Most countries have large shadow economies; however, 
developing countries have a larger shadow economy. Schneider (2009), who 
provides empirical evidence that the contribution of the shadow economy to 
GDP is quiet significant accounting for 40 to 50 percent in the developing 
world, corroborates this. The shadow economy has varied outcomes on a 
country’s social and economic environment which can be relatively stable and 
acceptable to extremely counter-productive to the countries stability and long-
term development prospects (Hassan & Schneider, 2015). As a result, robust 
interest on having an understanding of the shadow economy has increased in 
recent years.   
Traditionally, there has been mixed perceptions regarding to the relationship 
between the shadow economy and the mainstream economy.  In general, there 
are three schools of thought surrounding the relationship between the shadow 
economy and the mainstream (official economy). The perspectives are dualist, 
legalist and neo-structural framework (Wilson, 2011)
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 According to the neo-structuralist school of thought, economic growth is 
reliant on structural changes. Therefore, when certain key sectors undergo 
positive transformation, growth can flourish. Thus, neo-structuralist view the 
shadow economy as a hindrance to the development of the formal economy 
(Williams & Round, 2011). Their argument is that shadow economic activities 
are unproductive and destructive to the mainstream economy by eroding the 
potential tax base of a country by reducing tax compliance, increasing the budget 
deficit and ultimately weakening the overall economic growth (Schneider, 2010). 
Hence, the shadow economy has a reductive effect on the economy by virtue 
of distortion of national statistics (growth, unemployment, income distribution 
etc.). In addition, national policies become weak as they are drawn from distorted 
statistics. Additionally, the shadow economy promotes rent seeking and free 
riding as those in the shadows enjoy public services and infrastructure without 
contributing much towards the provision of this public facilities and services. 
Therefore, the shadow economy has an antagonistic effect on the development 
of the economy because it shrinks the size of the formal economy.
According to the second school of thought the legalist, the shadow economy 
may not be holistically negative to the development of the mainstream economy 
(De Soto, 1989). This view claims that shadow economic work diminish if the 
cost of doing business is easy to verify using evidence carefully compiled. 
In actuality, the official economy and the shadow economy exist in parallel, 
which gives way to the allocation of resources sub-optimally and also gives 
opportunity for distortion (Schneider & Enste, 2000). On one hand, the shadow 
economy promotes allocation distortion as a result of under-use of resources and 
factors of production. While on the other hand income generated in the shadow 
economy is largely spent in the formal economy. Furthermore, Schneider & 
Enste (2000) provides evidence in Germany that 2/3 of the income obtained 
from shadow economic activities was reinvested back into the formal economy. 
The view presents informal workers as entrepreneurs oppressed by stringent 
regulations that are difficult to follow.
Moreover, Jutting and de Laiglesia (2009) provide support of this view by 
stating that the shadow economy acts as a buffer for unemployment because 
it provides income generating opportunities to those people that cannot find 
ruminative occupation in the mainstream economy. The shadow economy 
also acts an incubator for entrepreneurship and enterprises because those in 
the informal sector have shown business acumen, creativity, dynamism and 
innovation (Williams & Round, 2011). Thus, the shadow economy has strong 
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linkages with the Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) sector because some 
SMEs are directly or indirectly connected to shadow economic activities. This 
positive outlook of the shadow economy has emerged from the fact that shadow 
economic activities provide means of livelihood for both rural and urban people 
unable to find work. In general shadow economic activities are low income 
activities that provide enough income for people to sustain their existence. 
Therefore, in its entirety the shadow economy acts as a complimentary force to 
the official economy.
The last school of thought, the dualist view, asserts that the shadow economy 
will vanish with development; specifically economic growth or adequate 
government support to employment creation (Wilson, 2011). This perspective 
argues that the relationship between the informal and mainstream economics 
and structural changes in the mainstream economy would reduce the shadow 
economy. Dualist view states that the shadow economy can only be a positive 
phenomenon only if harnessed and brought into the official economy (Williams 
& Round, 2011). This emergent discourse was developed from the view that 
the informal sector acts as a platform for enterprises, entrepreneurship and is 
an asset, but only if these ventures can be nurtured and transitioned into the 
formal economy (International Labour Organization, 2002; Rennoy et al., 2004 
& Small Business Council, 2004). Such enterprises, if formalised, it was argued, 
would contribute to the development of enterprises and the achievement of 
fuller employment.
In recognition of the unparalleled economic potential that can be gleaned 
through the informal sector, amongst other things, Eswatini adopted the Agenda 
2030 for Sustainable Development in 2015. In so doing committed herself to 
creating decent work and economic growth in goal number eight of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). Target 8.3 of decent work and economic growth 
specifically advocates for the promotion of development policies that encourage 
the formalization and growth of micro, small, and medium enterprises. Thus, 
harnessing and transitioning shadow economic activities into the formal 
economy will result in decent work for those in the shadows, thus ultimately 
stimulating economic growth. Furthermore, decent work is the blue-print to 
achieving all the 17 sustainable development goals.     
The “deshadowisation” initiative views the shadow economy in a positive 
light and advocates that deterrents such as stricter sanctions to change the cost 
benefit ratio, coupled with lucrative incentives encourage informal enterprises to 
formalise their operations (Novoseletsky, 2000). To achieve this, the simplification 
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of reporting systems and the registration process must provide an incentive for 
people to leave the shadow economy and formalise their economic activities.
The economy of Eswatini over the past 16 years has shown signs of resilience 
in times of severe recurrent droughts and economic shocks. In 2001/2002 the 
economy of Eswatini experienced a severe drought which affected 35.75 percent 
of the population (National Disaster Management Agency ([NDMA], 2016) as 
well as the economic downturn as a result of the September 11 bombing of the 
World Trade Centre. These events escalated the inflation rates to 11.68 percent. 
Shortly after recovering from the drought and economic crisis of 2001/2002, 
the economy of Eswatini was affected by another economic downturn.  This 
recession was a result of the worst drought in recent history affecting 40.11 
percent of the population (NDMA, 2016) and the global financial melt-down 
of 2007/08. As a consequence of these events the inflation was increased to a 
record-high 12.63 percent. Just as the economy was recovering from the drought 
and world financial crises in 2007/08, yet another economic crisis and mild 
drought was experienced in 2011/12. This drought affected 16.08 percent of the 
households in Eswatini (NDMA, 2016). Moreover, the government of Eswatini 
was faced with a budget crisis with the government struggling to pay salaries of 
public sector workers. This fiscal crisis was a direct consequence of the decline 
in the South African Custom Union (SACU) receipts, a historical high level 
of expenditure by the government and a high salary cap as well as the lack 
of access to domestic and foreign borrowing by the government.  This factors 
triggered the inflation to raise from raise from 6.10 in 2010/11 to 8.94 percent in 
2011/12 which was not as high compared to the previous years.   
Jutting and de Laiglesia (2009) provides evidence that the size of the shadow 
economy grows rapidly in periods of economic crisis because people that 
lose their employment tenure in the mainstream economy are absorbed by 
the informal sector. This has prompted the question; how big is the shadow 
economy in Eswatini and how has it affected the national income in times of 
drought and economic turmoil? The answers to these questions will be pertinent 
for a developing economy such as Eswatini, which is on a mission to resuscitate 
economic growth and also entering the last phrase of implementing the National 
Development Strategy (NDS). Figure 1 shows the impacts of drought on the 
population from the year 2001 up to 2016. It depicts the number of people that 
were affected by the drought as a proportion of the total population. Furthermore, 
Figure 1, illustrates the trends of the impact of drought on drought years over a 
period of 15 years.  
African Review of Economics and Finance  Vol 10 (2) 2018
50
FiguRe 1: impacT oF DRoughT on The populaTion
Source: National Disaster Management and Central Statistics Offi ce (2016)
While Figure 2 shows the growth trends of the nominal and real GDP over 
the past 15 years beginning from 2000 up to 2015.  Figure 2, depicts how the 
economy of Eswatini had grown in the past 15 years both in nominal and real 
terms. This was done to illustrate the impacts of drought and economic shocks 
on the economy. 
FiguRe 2: TRenDS oF gDp gRowTh in eSwaTini
Source: Central Statistics Offi ce (2016)         
2.2. Conceptual framework for the shadow economy  
Numerous empirical and theoretical studies have been conducted on the shadow 
economy in order determine the key role of this phenomenon in the functioning 
of the economy. However, due to the cumbersome nature of estimating the size 
of shadow economic activities using direct methods because of the hidden nature 
of such activities, researchers have opted on developing indirect methodologies. 
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This section reviewed the most important literature that concentrates on 
estimating the shadow economy and analysis of its determinants. 
Empirical evidence from Hassan and Schneider (2015), in their analysis 
of the Egyptian shadow economy found that the main causes of the shadow 
economy in Egypt were tax burden (direct and indirect tax), the size of the 
agricultural sector, quality of institutions, self-employment and regulations. 
Whereas, Schneider and Enste (2000) in their estimation of the size of the 
shadow economy in 76 developing, transition and OECD countries found that 
high taxes, social security contributions and the intensity of regulations were the 
main drivers of the shadow economy, especially in OECD countries. Dell’Anno 
et al. (2007) in their analysis of the shadow economy in three Mediterranean 
countries: France, Spain and Greece found that, there are different causes for the 
existence of the shadow economy in each country. In France the main drivers 
of the shadow economy were found to be tax burden, labour force participation, 
and self-employment. Whilst, in Spain the main causes of the shadow economy 
were found to be unemployment and public employment. Whereas, in Greece 
the causes of the shadow economy were found to be unemployment rate and 
self-employment. Utilizing these studies as the theoretical base, the studies 
assumed the drivers of the shadow economy in Eswatini to be the tax burden 
(direct and indirect tax), the size of the agricultural sector, institutional quality 
of governance institutions, unemployment and self-employment levels. 
2.3. Modelling the size of the shadow economy in Eswatini 
Throughout literature there are various approaches that are employed to quantify 
the size and growth of the shadow economy. However, this is still a difficult 
task, mainly because shadow economic activities are cash based and occur off 
the books because people in the shadows do not want to be exposed to the 
authorities while they conduct their activities. Nonetheless, there are direct and 
indirect approaches that can be used to quantify the shadow economy. The direct 
approach includes methods such as surveys and discrepancy approaches. The 
methods depends on survey sample based on voluntary replies, tax audits and 
other compliance methods. The limitation of this method is that, it depends on 
questions asked by the survey and other similar surveys. Resultantly, it is difficult 
to measure and compare informal economies in different countries. Additionally, 
this method uses a questionnaire, hence may be susceptible to moral hazard 
because respondents are not keen on admitting fraudulent behaviour or reporting 
their taxes information. Whereas, the indirect approach includes methods such 
as the currency demand approach (CDA) and the structural equation model 
(SEM) such as the multiple indicator multiple cause (MIMIC) model.
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The MIMIC model is a special case of structural equation model with a 
latent (unobservable) variable. The MIMIC model has advantage over direct 
methods because this technique examines the covariant structure between 
the observed and measurable causes and indicator simultaneously to obtain 
information about their relationship as well as the unobserved (latent) variable 
(Buehn &Schneider, 2008). Additionally the MIMIC model is applied on 
time series data to derive estimation of the shadow economy. For the purpose 
of our analysis the MIMIC model was used because it had the advantage of 
differentiating between causal factors and indicators. Also, the MIMIC model 
is complimentary to both the direct and indirect method (Buehn &Schneider, 
2008). The MIMIC model is a theoretically-based approach that attempts to 
confirm the impact of a set of exogenous variables on the latent variable (shadow 
economy), while simultaneously confirming the effects of the latent variable 
on the macroeconomic indicators (Farzanegan, 2009). Thus, the MIMIC model 
serves to testing economic theory as opposed to being an explanatory technique 
(Schneider, 2010). It is used to postulate the linkages between the latent variable 
and the observed variables based on literature (Farzanegan, 2009).  According 
to Trebicka (2014) the first paper to apply the MIMIC approach in the estimate 
the shadow economy was by Frey and Weck-Hannemen (1984) in the review 
of 17 OECD countries. This method has evolved over time with Aiguer et al. 
(1988) further adjusting the method in the dynamic model MIMIC (DYMIMIC) 
in their assessment of the shadow economy in the USA economy. Gile (1999) 
further adjusted the method to be accommodative of time series data more 
specifically unit root on the evaluation of the New Zealand shadow economy.
3. Methodology 
3.1. Description of data 
To quantify the size and assess the trends of the shadow economy, this paper used 
annual macroeconomic time series data from year 2000 up to 2016. Literature 
informed the selection of five macroeconomic variables for the econometric 
model. These are: tax (expressed as a share of GDP); agricultural value added 
(share of agricultural contribution to GDP); institutional quality of governance 
institutions (an index used to measure institutional quality and governance 
in Africa); unemployment rate (an indicator that shows unemployment as a 
proportion of the total labour force); self-employment (people that are formally 
registered to own private business as a percentage of the total population).
The real GDP rebased to 2016 to account for inflation was used as an 
indicator to measure the presence shadow economy. Other indicators used to 
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infer the presence of the shadow economy included money supply and total 
employment. Money supply is defined as the total currency in circulation outside 
the banking system while total employment rate was measured as the number 
of people employed as a proportion of the total population. The section below 
provide theoretical base for the selection of this macroeconomic indicators 
and the assumed hypothesis for testing. These indicators are divided into two 
classifications namely the drivers and the indicators of the shadow economy. 
Annual time series data was obtained from various government institutions 
and other international institutions such as the Mo Abraham foundation. Tax 
revenue data was obtained from the Eswatini Revenue Authority (SRA). While, 
agricultural value added, unemployment, inflation, population, labour force, 
GDP and employment data were requested from the Central Statistics Office 
(CSO). Regulation data was obtained from the Ibrahim Index for African 
Governance (IIAG) database, and self-employment data was acquired from the 
Ministry of Commerce business registration unit and business licensing unit. 
Lastly, money supply data was attained from the Central Bank of Eswatini.
3.2. Driver of the shadow economy 
Throughout literature, there are numerous factors that contribute to the growth 
and development of the shadow economy. These factors may be country specific 
and vary from one country to the next. For the purpose of this analysis; tax 
burden, the size of the agricultural sector, institutional quality of democratic 
institutions, unemployment and self-employment are assumed to be the main 
drivers of the shadow economy in Eswatini. This variables were selected 
based on available annual data during the period of the study. Furthermore, 
this variable are justified by literature because they are the most commonly 
documented drivers of the shadow economy worldwide. 
3.2.1 Tax burden 
In general, the usual starting point of quantifying the size of the shadow economy 
is to assess the relationship between the tax burden and the shadow economy. 
Throughout literature, the tax burden has been widely documented as the most 
popular cause for the growth and development of the shadow economy globally. 
The tax burden is of massive concern to economists worldwide because it 
influences the labour-leisure decision trade-off and also contributes to the labour 
supply in the shadow economy (Alañón & Gómez-Antonio, 2005; Schneider, 
2005; Hassan & Schneider, 2015). The greater the gap between the net salary 
for a worker and the total labour expenses in the official economy, the more 
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reasons for the workers to evade paying taxes and operate in the shadows 
(Schneider, 2012). In addition, the tax burden has a direct influence on the prices 
of goods and services in the formal economy as it stimulates an increase in 
the cost of production for goods and services. Therefore, SMEs operating in 
developing economies like Eswatini, are incentivised to operate in the shadows 
so as to avoid taxes and minimise their costs of production. When using MIMIC 
approach, the direct and indirect tax burden is quantified by the share of total 
tax burden on GDP.
Hypothesis 1: The higher the tax burden, the bigger the size of the shadow 
economy, ceteris paribus.
3.2.2. The size of the agriculture sector 
The importance of the agricultural sector has a momentous influence on the size 
of the shadow economy in most developing economies like Eswatini (Vuletin, 
2008). With agriculture viewed as the backbone of the economy in Eswatini, 
most people in the rural economy are engaged in agricultural activities. 
Additionally, rural folks are easily absorbed by the sector, since means of 
agricultural production such as land and labour are easily accessible. 
With the poverty levels in rural areas estimated at 69 percent, agriculture 
is conceived as the main source of livelihood contributing 70 percent of the 
economic activity in rural areas (Comprehensive Agricultural Sector Policy, 
2005). This sector contributes through food and income generation to support the 
livelihoods of rural dwellers. The size of the agricultural sector was quantifies 
by the share of agricultural contribution to GDP.
Hypothesis 2: The more dominant the agricultural sector, the larger the 
size of the shadow economy, ceteris paribus.
3.2.3. Institutional quality of governance institutions 
As part of the primary work in understanding the trends and size of the shadow 
economy, it is of great importance to understand the effects of the quality of 
public institutions. Good rules of law, by securing property rights and enforceable 
contracts, provide an incentive for people to stay in the formal economy and 
amplify the costs of operating in the shadows. However, the opposite is true, 
where corruption, bureaucracy, lack of transparency along with poor-public 
service delivery and weak rule of laws are often concomitant with a very large 
size of the shadow economy (Schneider, 2010: Hassan and Schneider, 2015). To 
measure the effects of institutional quality on the Shadow economy the Ibrahim 
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Index for African Governance (IIAG) was utilised. This index provides an 
annual assessment of the quality governance in all the 54 African states.
Hypothesis 3: The more efficient the quality of governance, the smaller the 
size of the shadow economy, ceteris paribus.
3.2.4. Unemployment 
In spite of the vast literature on the shadow economy, the causal correlation with 
regards to unemployment and shadow economy still remain unclear. However, 
Schneider et al. (2010) provides evidence that the unemployment rate has a 
massive influence in the size of the shadow economy in developing economies as 
well as in developed economies like the OECD countries. Tanzi (1999) remarks 
that the labour force in the shadows is extremely heterogeneous incorporating 
unemployed people and the non-official labour force such as the retired veterans, 
illegal immigrants, minors and homemakers. Another challenge associated 
with shadow economy emanates from the fact that some people may have two 
occupations, one in the formal economy and another in the shadows so that they 
can supplement their formal remuneration. This makes it difficult to effectively 
quantify the shadow economy because of the two jobs held by one person. In this 
sense unemployment was faintly correlated to the shadow economy.
Hypothesis 4: The higher the unemployment rate, the bigger the size of the 
shadow economy, ceteris paribus.
3.2.5. Self-employment level 
Throughout, literature the amount of self-owned businesses as a percentage of 
labour force in the official economy is perceived as a direct implication of the 
shadow economy. Hypothetical the assumption was that the self-employed are 
more incentivised to avoid following the tax regulations because they have a 
higher number of deductible expenses from both their tax base and personal 
income taxes. Also as a result of direct interaction with their clientele they 
can collude with their customers to dodge indirect taxes (Hassan & Schneider, 
2015). Self-owned businesses are motivated to hire informal and irregular 
employees because they have fewer internal and external auditing controls 
compared to formal organizations and bigger firms (Dell’Anno et al., 2007). 
Given, the prominence of the Small and Medium Enterprise (SMEs) sector in 
Eswatini and its dependence on the shadow economy directly and indirectly. 
The shadow economy acts as an incubator for entrepreneurship and enterprises 
because some of them started in the informal sector and graduated to the formal 
sector as they grew bigger.
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Hypothesis 5: The higher the rate of self-employment the bigger the size of 
the shadow economy, ceteris paribus.
3.3. Indicators of the presence of the shadow economy  
After comprehensively reviewing, the various drivers influencing the size of 
the shadow economy in Eswatini, the MIMIC model permits to account for the 
different indicators that show the presence of the shadow economy.
3.3.1. Real Gross Domestic Product (variable of scale) 
With reference to literature, there is no consensus with regards to the 
relationship between the shadow economy and official economy. On one 
hand various scholars such as Alanon and Gomez-Antonio (2005) postulate a 
positive correlation between the official economy and the shadow economy. 
The shadow economy permits for underprivileged people to find ways to sustain 
their livelihood by producing and selling cheap products as income generation 
activities. While, in contradiction other authors Schneider and Enste (2000); 
Dell’Anno and Schneider (2003) find an inverse relationship between these two 
variables. An increase in the size of the shadow economy leads to a decrease in 
the official economy because resources and factors are absorbed by the shadow 
economy creating a depressing effect on the growth of the official economy 
(Schneider & Enste, 2013; Alanon & Gomez Antonio, 2005). 
In the analysis, the real GDP (base year 2016) was used as an indicator to reflect 
the existence of the shadow economy in Eswatini and to test the relationship 
between the shadow economy and the official economy. In view of the fact that 
the shadow economy cannot be directly observed, the Real GDP was set as our 
reference variable and it was expected to have a negative sign. The value of Real 
GDP is fixed to -1 throughout the different model specifications. 
Hypothesis 6: The larger the shadow economy the lower the GDP is, ceteris 
paribus.
3.3.2. Currency in circulation 
Generally, activities in the shadow economy are off-the books cash based 
transactions to bypass detection by tax authorities and the government reporting 
system. Thus, such transactions are not done through credit/debts or check or 
bank transaction to conceal them. According to the Central Bank of Eswatini, 
money supply increased as a consequence of an increase in the currency 
circulation outside the bank system which rose by an annual rate of 6.17 percent 
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in 2011, increased further to 22.6 percent in 2012 and grew to 29.01 percent in 
2013. However, in 2014 the money supply, substantially dropped to -0.8 percent 
reaching critical levels as a result of the deficit in the balance of payment in 
Eswatini. Studies by numerous authors including Dell’Anno et al., (2007) and 
Schneider et al., (2010) provides empirical proof that there is a positive and 
significant correlation between the size of the shadow economy and the currency 
in possession of the public. For that reason, in the MIMIC model money growth 
was used as an indicator. In this analysis a time series of M12 is used.
Hypothesis 7: The larger the size of the shadow economy, the larger the 
currency held by the public, ceteris paribus. 
3.3.3. Total employment 
The third and final indicator used in the MIMIC model was total employment 
as a share of total population. The shadow economy has the ability to attract 
economic agents from the formal economy to work informally, thus leading 
to a decline in the availability of human resource in the mainstream economy. 
Numerous authors, such as Dell’Anno et al., (2007), Schneider et al. (2010), 
incorporated total labour force participation as an indicator of the increased 
informal activities shown in the reduction of the labour force rate. Although, 
the general definition of the labour force rate comprises total workforce willing 
and able to work; therefore, employed and unemployed. In that regard it was 
argued that focusing exclusively on total employment permits for the accurate 
measurement of the size of the shadow economy because of the mobility of the 
economic agents to operate in the shadow economy (Hassan & Schneider, 2015).
Hypothesis 8: The bigger the shadow economy, the lower the total 
employment rate, ceteris paribus.
Globally there are numerous causal and indicators that have been utilised to 
quantify the size of the shadow economy. Some of this variables include the 
rate of corruption, level of bureaucracy in government institutions, the intensity 
of regulations, lack of access to financial resource, institutions that are resistant 
to change, government subsidies, social security contributions and disposable 
income. Due to insufficient data on these variables for the period of the study 
(2000 to 2016) for the case of Eswatini, these variable were omitted in the 
MIMIC model.
2 M1 also called narrow money, includes coins and notes in circulation and other money equivalent that 
are easily convertible into cash.
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3.4. Methods and Procedures 
The ability of the MIMIC model to differentiate between causal factors and 
indicators rendered it suffi cient for the task. Furthermore, the MIMIC model 
is complimentary to both direct and indirect method (Buehn & Schneider, 
2008). When using the MIMIC model, it is crucial to have a theoretical base 
as justifi cation for the correlation between the latent variable and the observed 
variable, duly because this model tests the hypothesized relationship by 
examining its consistency with the actual data. The MIMIC model is divided 
into two components, the structural model and the measurement model. The 
structural model (equation 1) is utilised to show the latent variable ηt (shadow 
economy index) which is linearly determined by a set of exogenous casual 
variables (Xt). Where, γ is a vector of parameter to be estimated, and the subscript 
t denotes time.
Whereas, the measurement model (equation 2) connects the latent variable to a 
set of chosen indicators {Yt: real GDP (Y1), money growth (Y2) and employment 
rate (Y3)} and estimate the impact of the shadow economy on these indicators. 
Similarly, λ is a vector of parameters to be estimated and  ε t is a errors satisfying 
white noise. The unobservable variable is portrayed in terms of the observable 
variables and is shown as:
 
The MIMIC model approach acknowledges that there are numerous factors 
that infl uence the growth of the shadow economy in a country and observes their 
effects over a period of time as shown by the path diagram in Figure 3.
To quantify the size and trends of the shadow economy in Eswatini, the MIMIC 
model was utilised using the Stata software version 14.0. A structural equation 
model was developed to assess the causality among the used variable such as 
direct tax, indirect tax, agricultural value added, regulation, unemployment rate 
and self-employment contribute to the development of the shadow economy. A 
measurement model was also developed to link the shadow economy to a set of 
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FiguRe 3: The geneRal STRucTuRe oF The mimic moDel anD The hypoTheSizeD 
RelaTionShip beTween vaRiableS
The model was specifi ed and its parameters were subsequently estimated 
using the maximum likelihood method (ML). The parameters estimated were 
then used to predict the latent variable (shadow economy) and to calculate the 
MIMIC index percent from the estimated parameters (Schneider et al., 2009).  
ηt̂ is the calculated MIMIC index at time t; it estimates the shadow economy 
as a percentage of the offi cial economy. ηt̂ is the estimated value of the latent 
variable at time t; η̂2016  is the estimate of the shadow economy in the base year 
2016 and η*2016 is the exogenous estimate of the  shadow economy in 2016. The 
exogenous shadow economy is the exterior estimate, base value of the shadow 
economy in 2016, derived from previous studies.
Special attention was paid to the data stationarity test since annual 
macroeconomic data was utilised. In most cases macroeconomic variables do 
not satisfy the underlying assumption of stationarity due to cyclical trends as 
a result of seasonality and economic shocks. Hence, the problem of spurious 
regression may arise. To overcome the challenge of spurious regression, the 
time series is transformed into a stationary one. The annual time series data 
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Phillips-Parron (PP) test at level. The results of the two stationarity test were 
conflicting as the ADF test showed unit root while the PP test showed that the 
time series had no unit root, it was stationary. To reconcile the two unit root test, 
the data was then tested for normality to assess if the time series was normally 
distribution. Form the normality distribution it was determined that the results 
of the ADF test were normally distributed and the PP test results were dropped 
because they were not normally distributed. Using the ADF results the time 
series was differentiated once to remove the unit root in the time series and 
make it stationary.
After the data was tested for stationarity, it was further tested for co-integration, 
to determine if there was a long run relationship between the independent variable 
and the error term. The Engle and Granger two-step approach was used to test 
if all the six causal variables are co-integrated with each of the three indicator 
variables. The Engle and Granger two-step test showed all the causal variables 
were not co-integrated with each of the three indicator variables. This meant 
that the shadow economy had no long run relationship with all it indicators. 
Therefore, the data could be fitted into the MIMIC model to quantify the size of 
the shadow economy in Eswatini.  
To specify the MIMIC model all variables were differenced once, in particular 
real GDP (Y1), money growth (Y2) and Employment (Y3) were transformed to 
logarithm (model specification 1) and then further transformed to log-difference 
(model specification 2) in order to improve their distribution to normal.
4. Results and Discussions 
Table 1 presents results, starting with a MIMIC model 6-1-3 (six causes, one 
latent variable and three indicators). The iterative process of model specification 
involved eliminating insignificant variables in order to reach the best model 
specification. The best specification is MIMIC 2-1-2 for model 1 and MIMIC 
4-1-1 for model 2. The results show that from specification 1, the main drivers 
of the shadow economy are indirect taxation, self-employment, and formal 
employment. Contrary to expectation, there is an inverse relationship between 
the size of the shadow economy and self-employment. In consonance with 
expectation, taxation is positively associated with the size of the shadow 
economy. This implies that as the tax burden increases so does the size of the 
shadow economy. Worth noting is that tax evasion through opting to operate in 
the informal sector can be a cost to the society. Since government uses taxes to 
provide public goods (such as road infrastructure), theoretically at least, some 
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of which are used by businesses. In light of this view, informal businesses are 
free riding on the formal sector’s contribution. However, informal businesses 
can also create a stimulating effect since part of the income creates demand for 
goods and services produced in the formal economy.
With regards to specification 2 (MIMIC 4-1-1), the results in Table 1 show 
that indirect tax, agriculture value added, regulation, and self-employment are 
positively associated with the size of the shadow economy. This implied that 
an increase of these variables is associated with an increase in the size of the 
shadow. The positive relationship between the shadow economy and regulation 
is contrary to expectation. Similar to specification 1, self-employment is 
positively associated with the size of the shadow economy. 
To evaluate the model fit, the chi-square and the Root Mean Square Error 
of Approximation (RMSEA) measurement statistics are utilised. The chi-
square was used for testing the model against the alternative that the covariance 
matrix of the observed variables was constrained. A smaller value indicated a 
better model fit. The results of the model show a good model fit with a χ2 = 
3.66 at the MIMIC 2-1-2 specification and a χ2 = 10.13 at the MIMIC 4-1-
2 specification. Whereas when using the RMSEA test which accounts for the 
error of approximation in the population, a value of 0 indicates a good model fit. 
The results of the model show a good model fit with a RMSEA = 0.228 at the 
MIMIC 2-1-2 specification and a RMSEA = 0.00 at the MIMIC 4-1-2.
Contrary to a priori expectation, unemployment has no impact on the 
magnitude of the shadow economy in Eswatini. This implies that high level of 
unemployment in Eswatini does not directly translate into a relatively large size 
of the shadow economy. This is consistent with Hassan and Schneider (2015) 
who found a similar result for the Egyptian economy. This result implies that 
Emaswati are more inclined towards job seeking that entrepreneurship. Such 
inclination might be a factor of the education system that leans towards white-
collar jobs in the detriment technical and vocational education and training.  
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The study used the structural equation model to estimate an index time series 
for the shadow economy. The estimated trend of the of the Eswatini shadow 
economy as a proportion of the offi cial GDP is shown in Figure 4. The shadow 
economy was calibrated according to the amount recorded in 2016, the base 
year. This value was taken from Schneider (2005) and Schneider et al., (2010) 
studies and represents 37.4 percent of the offi cial economy. The size and trend 
of the shadow economy in Eswatini, from 2000 to 2016, ranges between 35.4 
percent (in year 2004) and 39.0 percent (in year 2000). At the end of the period 
under review, the shadow economy of Eswatini was equivalent to 37.4 percent 
of the formal economy.
FiguRe 4: Size anD TRenD oF The ShaDow economy oF eSwaTini aS a pRopoRTion oF 
gDp
Source: Authors’ own compilation (2017)
5. Conclusion
The study sought to quantify the size and analyse the trend of the shadow 
economy in Eswatini over a, from year 200 to 2016, using the MIMIC model. 
From the results, it apparent that the shadow economy accounts for a signifi cant 
proportion of the offi cial economy of Eswatini and its magnitude has been 
declining however at a slow rate over this period. The fi ndings show that the 
shadow economy in Eswatini was equivalent to 39 percent of the GDP at the 
beginning of our analysis and declined gradually to 37.4 percent in 2016. This 
means that if all these economic activities were registered and regulated they 
would contributed an additional 37.4 percent to the 2016 GDP value of the 
country. In currency value, it means the country’s GDP would have increased by 
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E20.5 billion if all the informal businesses were transitioned to the mainstream 
economy. The main driving factors of the shadow economy in Eswatini are 
the tax burden in the form of direct tax and indirect tax, the contribution of the 
agricultural sector, institutional, and self-employment. The inertia of shadow 
economy at a high proportion of GDP depicts the lack of incentive to informal 
business operator to transition into the formal economy. Such incentives are 
necessary to create an enabling environment that will incentivise informal 
businesses to transition out from the shadow economy into the mainstream 
economy.
6. Policy Implications and Recommendations
From the study results, policy makers can identify the major factors that influence 
peoples’ incentives to participate in the shadow economy. Policy reforms by 
formalizing of the shadow economy are necessary to be able to reduce the size 
and the trends of the shadow economy. Most essentially, policy makers need 
to develop policies that focus on the quality of institutions (regulations) by 
creating democratic and transparent institutions with lesser regulatory burden, 
corruption and bureaucracy. This will be able to restore the confidence and trust 
of the economic agents in the overall system of the country and to be able to have 
effective strategies to reduce the shadow economy in Eswatini. In order to reduce 
the impact of self-employment on shadow economy the government can create 
an enabling environment, which would ultimately make self-employment easier 
and positively reduce unemployment while directly contributing to reducing 
the size of the shadow economy. To reduce the tax burden and incentivise 
businesses to transition from the shadow economy into the formal economy, 
policy makers should focus on reducing the overall taxation, especially the 
indirect taxation. To reduce the incidence of agricultural producers to operate in 
the shadow economy. It is recommend that agricultural marketing boards should 
improve their incentive mechanisms such as the pricing system, transparency, 
amongst other things, in order to incentives producers to sell their products to 
the marketing boards. This can ultimately encourage agricultural producers to 
commercialise their agricultural production because they have viable market 
through which they can sell their products.    
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